



Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) War Game 12-21, November 2003

Assessment Report

The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) War Game was conducted 12-21 November 2003 at the Naval War College in Newport Rhode Island. The war game was designed to test the JFMCC maritime planning process developed by NWDC, MCCDC, C2F and C3F as outlined in the JFMCC Tactical Memorandum (TACMEMO). Insights from the war game will be used to refine the JFMCC planning process for further experimentation, specifically in Commander Joint Task Force Exercise (CJTTFEX-04-2), scheduled for 10-21 June 2004, and in Sea Viking '04. The goal is to provide future JFMC Commanders with a collaborative maritime operation planning and integration process that will transition strategic and operational objectives from the Joint Force Commander into tactical actions in a dynamic battlespace.

Marine Corps participation in the game included a Marine Colonel and 16 Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from the operating forces, the Rhode Island MTU, HQMC, MCCDC, MCWL, and MSTP. The game organization is depicted in figure 1-1 below. The organization was designed to test two specific areas associated with JFMCC operations: first, how does the JFMCC internal planning process work and, secondly, how does the JFMCC planning process interact with senior, lateral, and subordinate commanders? The game design established a Blue Cell, which included the JFMCC positions critical to the planning processes, and a White Cell whose purpose was to stimulate the JFMCC planning processes.

Blue Cell	White Cell
JFMCC Staff (overall)	White Cell (Overall)
Maritime Future Plans Center (MFPC)	JFC
Maritime Intelligence & Analysis Center (MIAC)	Intel JFC FCCs SMCs
Maritime Integrated Support Center (MISC)	FCCs JFACC JFLCC JSOTF
Maritime Operations Center (MOC) Future Operations Center (FOPS) Current Operations Center (COPS)	SMCs CSG 1/2 ESG 1/2 TASWC/MIWC

Figure 1-1

JFMCC TACMEMO Background

In February of 2003 the Naval War College hosted a conference to discuss lessons learned from Millennium Challenge '02 (MC-02) and to further develop the JFMCC Maritime Operational Planning Process (MOPP). Findings from MC-02 highlighted several problems within the MOPP including: synchronization was ad hoc, feedback into the planning cycle was non-existent, quality of plans could not be measured, and knowledge management was ineffective. Based on these findings, it was decided that a new MOPP was required that could help the JFMCC effectively plan and execute the maritime portion of the JFC campaign plan.

At this conference NWDC presented a draft TACMEMO modeled after the USAF planning process that produces an Air Tasking Order (ATO). Marine Corps representatives at this meeting pointed out that a maritime campaign does not focus solely on targeting but addresses other warfighting functions. It was clear that this version of the TACMEMO did not reflect established USMC and joint planning doctrine. As a result, it was agreed by NWDC to meet later in February 2003 and re-examine the TACMEMO from a more Naval standpoint.

EFDC, MCWL and MSTP began working with NWDC to establish a Naval planning process within the JFMCC TACMEMO. At a follow on meeting held in April, both C2F and C3F became involved in the process in order to support their participation in future exercises. Also in April, JFCOM hosted a conference that provided insights on how the Standing Joint Force Headquarters of the future would do their planning. In the months leading up to the war game several workshops and conferences were held to further develop the process, products, and manning structure that would support the November JFMCC war game.

USN Objectives for the JFMCC War Game

The JFMCC War Game looked at dynamic replanning and execution within a battle rhythm structure, with the goal of refining the Maritime Operational Planning Process as described in the TACMEMO. The goal was to exercise and objectively assess how the JFMCC processes described within the TACMEMO worked. The objectives for the game were to see how the JFMCC staff:

- Managed its internal execution and planning processes
- Performed dynamic retasking and replanning within current and future operations
- Interacted with the other functional component commands (JFACC, JFLCC and JSOTF)
- Interacted with the Joint Force Commander (JFC)
- Interacted with its Maritime Subordinate Commands (MSC)

The results of the war game will be used to refine the TACMEMO for use in follow-on JFMCC experiments and exercises and to influence the Joint JFMCC Doctrine draft in development at CFFC and the Joint Staff.

Game Construct

The JFMCC war game used a classified scenario based on Millennium Challenge '02 in order to take advantage of the developed databases and planning products. The participants in the game filled key billets on a representative JFMCC staff to support game objectives. Forty-six positions were filled in the JFMCC staff. The diagram below highlights how participants were distributed across the staff. In addition to the JFMCC




Figure 1-2

Staff there was 33 Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) filling billets as part of the White cell, to include the JFC, JSOTF, JFACC, JFLCC and the Maritime Subordinate Commands.

A compressed battle rhythm was developed to ensure that formal communication occurred vertically between the JTF, JFMCC and MSCs, as well as horizontally between the Component Commanders. The various events in the battle rhythm were designed to cause the JFMCC staff to collaborate and step through the JFMCC planning process. The battle rhythm compressed a 24-hour staff day into an 8-hour experimental game day. A Master Scenario Event List (MSEL), a list of scenario driven events, was developed for game injection to stimulate various activities in support of the experiment objectives to address JFMCC processes. The battle rhythm used during the game is depicted in figure 3-1.




Figure 3-1

A Collaborative Information Environment was used in the game and consisted of the Defense Collaborative Tool Set (DCTS), Digital Dashboard, Knowledge WEB, Net Meeting, Microsoft Office, Voice over IP, and phones. C2PC was the COP situational awareness tool. This suite of capabilities enabled a networked collaborative environment with operational level detail for planning and execution.

USMC Order of Battle

The USMC order of battle consisted of two Expeditionary Strike Groups. Assets and systems used in the game were commensurate with the 2007 timeframe.

Scenario

The scenario, classified SECRET (NOFORN), concerns a single Major Combat Operation in the Southwest Asia, Area of Responsibility (AOR). There were three Phases to the scenario, Phase I Setting Conditions, Phase II Decisive Operations and Phase III Transition. The JFMCC was the main effort in Island raids and a Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM), Phase I and II respectively. Injects to the scenario tested the JFMCC ability to react to changes within the battlespace that would require re-tasking and re-planning.

USMC Game Participants

<u>SME Billet</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Supporting Organization</u>
Deputy JFMCC	Mr. Rick Hibbert Phase I, COL Robert Love Phase II	MCCDC
Ops Assessment	LtCol Ernest King	MCCDC
Asst Battle Watch Captain	LtCol Keith Rosdahl	II MEF
Current Amphib OPS	LtCol Louis W. Walter	II MEF
JFMCC Surface Fires	MAJ Jon Holmborg	MARFORPAC
Future Asst Air OPS	MAJ Joseph Layko	II MEF
Amphib (FUOPs)	MAJ Paul Landry	HQMC
Red Cell (FUOPs)	LtCol Will Brown	II MEF
JFLCC Response Cell	CAPT Matthew J Stewart	MCCDC
JFLCC Response cell (Intel)	LtCol Chris Murphy	MTU, Rhode Island -1
Orders /Frago Staffing	GySgt Albert Lodi	MTU, Rhode Island -1
FUOPs observer	Mr. Mark Jennings	MCCDC
FUOPs observer	Mr. James Poleto	MCCDC
COPs observer	LCDR Charlie Hazard	Wargaming MCWL
FUOPs observer	Ms. Tracy Mork	MSTP

USMC Observations (In bold if a significant observation)

- **The CIE has great potential for assisting Naval Staffs in the planning and execution of military operations.** It should be noted that as the players became familiar with the CIE tools available to them, they were able to engage more effectively in the planning process. Having both a new planning process and new

CIE tools to work with made the first phase of the war game especially difficult but during the second week the participants were more adept in following the specific steps of the planning process. This helped identify gaps in the process, which in turn will help revise the TACMEMO.

- **The bandwidth requirements for the Collaborative Information Environment used in the war game were 4 times greater than what is available on a current day aircraft carrier. Future experimentation should incorporate realistic limitations, like bandwidth, to the collaborative information environment used by a JFMCC.**

JFMCC Wargame observations:

- There was a fundamental lack of understanding by many Navy officers of the planning process in current doctrine and that described in the TACMEMO. This included what specific input, process and output is expected during each step of the planning process.
- The Maritime Planning Group (MPG) did not effectively use C2PC to build their Course of Actions (COAs).
- The MPG started to present the JFMC Commander with a COA development brief, but carried the brief through to the Comparison/Decision step in the process, thus skipping the COA Analysis (Wargaming) step.
- During Phase I the JFMC Commander did not provide the MPG with evaluation criteria necessary to select the best COA.
- During Phase I the MPG did not use a decision matrix to properly compare the COAs for evaluation by the JFMC Commander.
- Future Ops Cell (FUOPs) should have delivered the Phase I stage A plan to Current Ops (COPs), because this did not happen COPs did not execute the plan.
- Commander's intent presented to the Maritime Planning Group (MPG) did not include a desired end-state, which prevented the FUOPs from developing a comprehensive Course of Action (COA),
- At the completion of Mission Analysis step the JFMCC staff should have released a Warning Order to the MSCs.

Information Management Observations

- During phase I the JFACC requested Spot Light services, in support of Theater Missile Defense (TMD), from the JFMCC via a Maritime Support Request (MSR). It took the JFMCC two days in order to respond to the request. The delay was due to miscommunications and information management shortfalls.

- Information concerning an F-16 that was shot down during the exercise was not effectively disseminated throughout the staff. This impacted the JFMCC because the MSCs immediately commenced CSAR operations.

Maritime Task Plan and Maritime Mission Order Observations:

- There should be a common format for Support Requests instead of individual Maritime, Air, and Ground support requests.
- The Maritime Task Plan (MTP) should have additional sorting capability, i.e. identify all active MSRs from the JFACC, and business rules that allows certain information to be color-coded, i.e. JFMCC high priority tasks.
- The MTP was supposed to help integrate the planning process across the functional components. However White Cell personnel in the JFLCC were not aware of how to use the MTP.
- The purpose and value of the Maritime Mission Order (MMO) needs to be reviewed. As an execution order it will compete with operation orders (OPORDs) and Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs), which could lead to confusion among subordinates receiving these various types of orders.

JFMCC Roles and Responsibilities Observations:

- Key cells within the MIAC should be moved to Current Operations to include; Information Operations, METOC, and Operations Assessment. Moving these functions into Current Operations will enhance the planning process.
- The Future Operations Cell (FUOPs) did not seek the JFMCC intent and guidance during the mission analysis step of the process., JFMCC intent and guidance should have been based on the initial Waning Order (WARNORD).
- No staffing process was in place to handle MSRs. Lacking such a process, the Maritime Operations Officer became the single point-of-contact for all MSRs coming into the JFMCC. As a result, MSR tracking and ultimately MSR responses were inefficient. Additionally, the Maritime Operations Officer was diverted from his primary duties.
- The red cell for FUOPs was initially placed in the Maritime Intelligence and Analysis Center (MIAC). The individual in this billet moved into the FUOPs cell so he could better support FUOPs planning.
- The FUOPs did not coordinate with their Maritime Subordinate Commanders (MSCs) during the mission analysis step of the process. This prevented key inputs from going into mission analysis.

Conclusions

Five areas identified in the JFMCC war game are important to USMC interests:

- The prominent issue is the lack of Navy Officer training in the joint and naval planning processes. The training issue, which became evident immediately in the war game, is predominantly an internal Navy problem. Its solution will be fundamental to successful JFMCC operations.
- The CIE is increasingly important to JTF and JFMCC planning and USMC operations. Current CIE bandwidth requirements are a significant issue.
- Information management within the JFMCC staff was another problem that too frequently prevented the staff from making quick and informed decisions.
- Key concepts such as the Maritime Task Plan and the Maritime Mission Order, which were designed to help integrate planning (both vertically and horizontally), need to be revised to improve the planning process.
- Roles and responsibilities within the JFMCC staff need to be more clearly defined.

USMC Recommendations

Doctrine/TACMEMO: The Marine Corps needs to remain engaged with the Navy in developing the JFMCC TACMEMO and JP 3-32 draft because these documents will mold how future JFMC Commanders command and control their assigned maritime forces in support of the JFC's campaign plan. So far USMC representatives from MCCDC have successfully influenced the process. The war game brought Operational Force Marines into the process (II MEF and MARFORPAC) and their input will no doubt help develop this important concept.

Training: JFMCC success in Joint operations will depend on significant improvement in Navy ability to conduct joint and naval planning. The Marine Corps should consider offering assistance to the Navy based on its success with the MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP). Some suggestions that came out of the game concerning the training issue included having MSTP go to the numbered Fleets to provide training or having MSTP conduct a "Train the Navy Trainers" session. Perhaps a long-term goal might be for the Navy to create an MSTP-type organization that concentrates on training 3 star commanders and their staffs.

Organization: Based on the war game insights, information management should be addressed in the next revision of the TACMEMO. At a minimum, there needs to be an Information Management Officer who would be responsible for implementing an Information Management Plan. The goal is to coordinate and ensure that pathways exist to make certain quality information flows between the various cells of the JFMCC. An Information Management Plan would provide guidance to ensure quality information was available to the staff. It also would allow the commander time to assess the situation and focus on those critical information requirements. The key is to facilitate the decision-making process by providing the Commander with timely and accurate information.

A joint writing team will rework the TACMEMO in February 2004 and address the issues and recommendations identified during the game. After that and prior to CJTFEX '04-2, it would be beneficial to evaluate how the changes incorporated in the TACMEMO will affect the process. Likewise, insights on the process that come out of the CJTFEX should be used to further refine the TACMEMO in support of Sea Viking '04 experimentation.

- Two new concepts that were incorporated into the JFMCC TACMEMO were the Maritime Task Plan (MTP) and the Maritime Mission Order (MMO). The MTP concept needs to be reworked in order to more effectively integrate maritime capabilities into the joint force. The MMO provided an execution order for the JFMCC and allowed non-collaborating partners to participate in the process to enhance synchronization of maritime operations. Revising the MTP and MMO in the TACMEMO will help reduce confusion and facilitate integrated planning and execution of joint operations.
- Finally, insights from the game indicate that there was confusion concerning the roles and responsibilities within the different cells that made up the JFMCC staff. This caused a problem in transitioning a plan from FUOPs to COPs for execution. Confusion over roles and responsibilities also became evident in maintaining the Maritime Task Plan. The role of Current Operations in maintaining the Maritime Task Plan needs to be more clearly defined in the February workshop.